Winner, 2008 George Walford International Essay Prize.
The independence of the judiciary is something which is precious to every single member of the community. You must be able to go into court and know that the person sitting in judgment is neutral.
– Sir Igor Judge 
It is well known that women in particular and small boys are liable to be untruthful and invent stories.
– Judge Sutcliffe, 1976 
Judicial independence lies at the heart of the concept of modern government. This theory, in which judges must be free to act independently of those with political and economic control, has its roots in the doctrine of separation of powers. Believing that the concentration of state power in the same hands could lead to tyranny, Montesquieu argued that the most important freedom was the independence of the judiciary: “There is no liberty, if the judiciary is not separated from the legislative and executive.” 
Montesquieu’s idea of freedom arises from the separation of powers. Most democratic governments exhibit this separation in varying degrees. In some jurisdictions – such as the United States – this is observed by ensuring that no office holder in government can legally be allowed to wield power belonging to another branch. In the UK there is no strict separation between the legislative and the executive: the law-making function belongs to both organs. The judiciary, however, is separate from the other branches, and is meant to act as a check on them. An independent judiciary should prevent the executive or legislature from manipulating the outcome of cases. By being neutral – in other words, devoid of public or private influence – the judiciary should ensure the protection of the rights of ordinary people and uphold the rule of law.  Such independence is generally believed to be vital to the functioning of a democratic society; as Sir Igor Judge stated, “it is something
The extent of judicial independence is, however, has been the focus of intense debate. The crucial question is what this essay will explore: can the judiciary be truly independent? More importantly, what does “independence” mean – does it refer primarily to the freedom from pressure from the executive, or does it also mean impartiality and lack of corruption?
In order to even begin to answer these questions, it is first necessary to examine where the judiciary fits into the institution of government. But what is “government”? The term itself means different things to different people. According to the theory of systematic ideology, government, which is the outward manifestation of the ideas, beliefs and values present in each political movement, can come in many forms. In Beyond Politics, George Walford states that beliefs about the broader issues of politics tend to come in sets, each of them with a group of people attached to it. These sets have come to be termed ideologies. 
In systematic ideology, the main political movements – from conservatism and liberalism, all the way to communism and anarchism – appear as the major ideologies, of which there are six (the seventh, Ideology of Ideologies, has as its task “resolution of the problems arising from their interaction”).  In this essay it will be argued that systematic ideology can offer a way to understand how judicial independence manifests itself in the Major Ideologies, and that in doing so, it will be possible to observe how it interacts with the ideals of government, specifically that of the United Kingdom. This, in turn, will enable us to analyse whether the concept of judicial independence is, in practice, viable given the makeup of British government; in other words, is the independence of the judiciary real in today’s society – or is it a mere fiction?
This paper will be divided into three parts: the first is a short introduction to systematic ideology, and the second a discussion of judicial independence and its manifestations in various forms of government, with particular reference to the UK. The third and final section will be an evaluation of whether, in the context of where it lies in the spectrum of ideologies, judicial independence can realistically fulfill its goals of protecting the rights of members of society and upholding the rule of law.
Systematic ideology: a brief primer
Zvi Lamm defines ideology as “a system of assumptions with which people identify… [which] organize, direct and sustain people’s volitional and purposive behaviour.” He goes on to state that the assumptions on which an ideology is based are not collected at random but constitute an organized and systematic structure.
Systematic ideology takes as its starting point an observation of the limited success achieved by the reformers and revolutionaries. According to Walford, as the changes that a political class seeks to achieve increase, its size shrinks and its influence weakens. This provides a preliminary explanation as to why socialism, communism and anarchism have not managed to significantly take root. Although these movements have a presence in most societies, the social practices they advocate have remained aspirations at best.
In Walford’s framework, the major ideologies are divided into two groups: the eidostatic and the eidodynamic.  He also provides a summary of each in “Meet Systematic Ideology.” The eidostatic ideologies are directed against the outside or the “cosmos,” i.e. the individual finds restrictions on his or her freedom in the environment. Within this first group are three ideologies: Expediency, Domination and Precision.
The aim of Expediency is to do what is convenient, without thinking about anything much except as it affects them or their immediate group. Walford describes its meaning: “Expediency controls the unconsidered part of our intentional behaviour. Every time we do simply what we wish, or what is convenient, without bringing principles to bear or making any effort to achieve precision, we act under the influence of the expedient ideology.”  Hence, Expediency boasts the biggest numbers as everyone has, in one way or another, instinctively done what is “natural.”
Domination is associated with establishment, principle, the state, conventionality, commitment, devotion, discipline, authoritarian relation, and social production. Compliance with the rules gives predictable behaviour, enabling large societies to function. Conservative politics is the political manifestation of this. Walsby notes the key characteristics of the conservative: strong identification with the national group, the nation, the race (national unity, “bull dog breed” etc.); love of heroes and of strong, forceful leadership, of “character” rather than of intellect or understanding; preference for practical action over theoretical consideration. 
Precision is the ideology of hard science, logic and accountancy. Ethics predominates over conformity and compliance. Humanism, agnosticism and freethinking begin to appear, with multiplicity and the ‘billiard-ball’ universe. The political movement this represents is liberalism. 
The eidodynamic ideologies – Reform, Revolution, and Repudiation – are opposite in outlook from the eidostatic, as they are directed against human society, which they see as the cause of problems ranging from poverty to social inequality.
Reform seeks profound and gradual change; increasingly independent thinking leads sometimes to atheism, sometimes to mysticism, inspirational or esoteric religion. Socialism, an expression of this ideology, proposes to improve the human condition by a fundamental reformation of society. 
Revolution, meanwhile, sets its own values aggressively against conventional ones. It assumes classes to be in a conflict resolvable only by revolution, violent if need be; these social relations override other influences. Religion and greenism are condemned as a bourgeois misdirection of the workers.
Repudiation, the most “extreme” of the ideologies whose political manifestation is Anarchism, condemns all that has gone before, demanding immediate elimination of government, classes, religion and private ownership of the means of production, resulting in free access to goods in place of the exchange of commodities.
Ideology of ideologies recognises and accepts all of the above, and has as its task the resolution of the problems arising from their interaction. 
A key characteristic of each of the major ideologies (except the last) is that it assumes its own ideology to be sufficient for all purposes. In practice, however, a multiplicity of ideological complexities exist side-by-side; a Conservative government, for instance, may have a Labour or Liberal minority. Although the parties are able to tolerate other ideologies, this is due more to a modification in attitude than overt acceptance.  Anarchism is the exception, as its ethos is to exclude all other ideologies.
Excluding Expediency, which by definition is non-political, modern societies identify most strongly with the eidostatic ideologies of Domination and Precision, most commonly manifested in the conservative and liberal movements respectively. The enduring attachment of the great majority to the eidostatic ideologies defeats the efforts of the eidodynamics to set up their intended society. Even where they have succeeded in instigating revolution, the result is often vastly different from that intended by the revolutionaries.  In today’s society, the eidodynamic ideologies, while maintaining a minority presence in existing social structures, are unable to break into power.
The manifestation of judicial independence in the Major Ideologies
Given that modern societies overwhelmingly adhere to the eidostatic ideologies, into which one does the theory of judicial independence fall? Prima facie, the concept seems to slot into the category of Precision, which has its political manifestation in representational government. The UK Parliamentary system provides for government selected by the electorate, which chooses MPs from a number of candidates. Although the electorate does not choose the judiciary directly, the latter also is part of government, as it forms the third organ of state. Indeed, Walford states that the “government of Britain” not only means the group of people who exercise power, but also the process by which Britain is governed: “not only the rulers, but also the ruled.”  Walford was referring to the “ruled” as the electorate, but this can be extended to suggest that the judiciary are both rulers and ruled. As members of the third branch of government, they, through the courts, are empowered to make an authoritative determination of what is the law. As individuals, however, they are no different to any other members of the electorate; as citizens they themselves are subject to government and the law.
One of the key concepts underpinning the independence of the judiciary is that judges should not be bullied by the executive into making judgments favourable to the latter. In M v Home Office , the Home Secretary ignored a court order because he thought it was wrongly made, to which the court made it clear that this action was in breach of the doctrine of separation of powers. The courts can also exercise their power to make a “declaration of incompatibility” in which they consider that the terms of a statute are incompatible with Britain’s obligations with the Human Rights Act 1998. In practice, this means that the courts are saying that there is a possible infringement of human rights, and it can, in effect, force Parliament to amend the offending statute.
In this respect, judicial independence exhibits the characteristics of Liberalism (an example of Precision), which seeks to effect change through continual improvement of what already exists.  Liberalism attempts to perfect society and has as its watch-words freedom, tolerance, and liberty; the individual is the end and society the means.  In making declarations of incompatibility, the judiciary acknowledges that an individual has human rights that are sacrosanct and must not be violated, while in its ability to counter the executive where the latter attempts to breach the separation of powers, it attempts to emphasise its freedom from outside pressure in passing judgments.
It is worth noting that M v Home Office was a case concerning the rights of the individual. The court intervened because the Home Secretary refused to obey an order to procure the return of M, a refugee who had been deported, back to England. As Lord Donaldson of Lymington stated in his judgment in the Court of Appeal, “it is precisely in those circumstances that individual citizens should be able to look to the judiciary for protection under the law.”  Thus Liberalism, with its focus on the individual vis-à-vis the state, can be seen in operation here.
Also central to the independence of the judiciary is the notion that it must uphold the rule of law. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, the Lord Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of England and Wales, has underscored the importance of this duty:
“It is the role of the judiciary, in practice, to uphold the rule of law, to apply the rule of law, to enforce the rule of law, and to do that they have to be independent of outside influence.” 
The rule of law refers to the principle that those in government should not be able to exercise power arbitrarily. Adherence to the rule of law is essential in safeguarding individual rights from erosion by those in power. If the ideology of Domination seeks authoritarian control and compliance with the rules, then the rule of law in a democratic society seems aligned with Precision and Liberalism; properly implemented, it should allow the individual some measure of freedom from interference by the state, particularly in matters concerning his or her liberty and basic human rights.
Judicial independence: a reality or mere fiction?
Whether judicial independence can be said to be “Liberal,” however, is a contentious issue. The prevailing motif in many democratic societies is that of Lady Justice carrying a set of scales, meting out justice fairly and equally, without fear or favour. At the same time, the notion of judicial independence appears to champion the cause of the “little guy.” I will argue, however, that there are serious limitations with classifying the theory as Precise or Liberal – and that it in many respects it aligns more closely with the Dominant ideology, as will be demonstrated.
The judiciary, by definition, is part of the tripartite system of government. Can it, therefore, truly be free of outside influence, since in fact it is one of the “rulers”? In the Dominant ideology, of which conservatism is its political manifestation, Walford suggests that it is toward a “system of decision making in which some people exercise greater influence than others, rather than a strict counting of heads that conservatives tend.”  It is significant that judges are not chosen by the electorate; rather, senior legal positions in Britain, have been, until very recently, political appointments. The Lord Chancellor, a member of the executive and the legislature, was responsible for these appointments. The influence of the government with the judges, and vice-versa, would have played a role both during and after the appointment process. This could have the potential to compromise the neutrality of the judiciary to swing in favour of the government if pressured to do so.
Alistair Gillespie describes the method by which judicial appointments were traditionally made: clouded in mystery with “secret soundings.”  Lord Elwyn-Jones, the former Lord Chancellor, explained the process:
“When a vacancy had to be filled, the heads of the Divisions… were invited into my office to consider likely names. Usually we agreed as to the one most meriting appointment. Occasionally two names were equally supported. Then the choice was left to me.” 
The potential appointee would then be invited to accept a seat on the bench. This system was criticised as untenable, as it propagated an “old boys’ network.” In this respect the selection process is similar to that of the leader of the Conservative Party until the 1980s, as described by Walford: “[he] emerged from discussions among the few most influential conservatives.” 
In 2005 sweeping changes were made to the judicial appointments system in the Constitutional Reform Act. Under the new rules, a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC), a panel composed of both lay and judicial members, is now responsible for the appointments. However, these reforms have not, so far, produced any meaningful change in the composition of the judges appointed: they are still overwhelmingly white and middle-class. Mrs Justice Dobbs, one of just ten High Court women judges and the only ethnic minority judge, expressed concern that moves to create a more diverse judiciary are failing to have any impact in boosting the numbers of women judges.  This is symptomatic of the rest of the judiciary. Of the five most senior judges in the UK, all five are male and white, and the four who declared their educational background were privately educated and studied at the University of Cambridge. 
The lack of diversity in the judiciary – what Vera Baird calls a “private members’ club for privileged white men”  – can be seen as a manifestation of Domination, which identifies itself with the establishment and the status quo. Diversity, which is commonly associated with the multiplicity and free-thinking logic of Precision, has no place in Domination. The situation has been criticised as compromising judicial independence, not only in Britain but also in similar jurisdictions with the Parliamentary model. McHugh LJ of Western Australia suggests that the judiciary must reflect the diversity of society at large or risk losing the confidence of the public. “When a court is socially and culturally homogenous,” states McHugh, “it is less likely to command public confidence in the impartiality of the institution.”  Subscribers to the Dominant ideology, such as conservatives, however, are more concerned with preserving the established; as Walford notes, they are “too sensible to abandon what has been proven viable.”  Walsby similarly observes that the conservatives have an “aversion for social, economic or racial equality.'”  The conservatives would argue that since the judiciary has been run by white men for hundreds of years, surely there is nothing wrong with it continuing to do so.
The problem with a homogeneous judiciary is that it may be at odds with the demands of today’s society, which is undeniably multicultural. Gary Slapper has pointed out that judges with same background can “feed into the law only a relatively narrow splinter of experience.”  Slapper goes on to suggest that prejudice spouted from the mouths of judges, who are symbols of authority and government, has nourished social bigotries. For instance, Mr Justice Harman infamously told a woman witness who wanted to be addressed with the title Ms, “I’ve always thought there were only three kinds of women: wives, whores and mistresses, which are you?”
Inevitably, then, judgments are coloured by the prejudices of the judges, who project their own ideologies not only to the litigants and witnesses but also to future generations of society, who, in a common-law jurisdiction, will be bound by these decisions. For every Lord Denning – who is revered as one of the most creative judges in English legal history and is said to have “bent the law into interesting directions”  – there are probably many more with less welcome biases. According to Slapper, chauvinism from figures of authority can affect the mindset of ordinary people.  Hence, the ideologies in the judgments trickle down to influence the world-view of those affected by them, a process similar to the educational experience in the classroom, in which students learn both formally and informally:
“This extra-curricular learning, this informal education, is not confined to facts and details. It includes also those broad general assumptions that are implied by the facts of immediate experience, the assumptions that form the bases of the different major ideologies.” 
Those whose ideology can be influenced by a single judgment includes, in varying degrees, not only the people reading it in written form, but also those taking part in cases in which the judgment is quoted, the lawyers preparing any related cases, the future judges of these cases, as well as all those affected, directly or indirectly, by the decisions resulting from the judgment. Taken together, this body forms a significant group; multiply that by several hundred judgments, and the result is a sizeable proportion of the population.
It is hardly surprising that given the powerful impact of such ideologies on the public, the judiciary itself has developed a rule against bias. Simply put, the rule requires that any judge with a specific legal interest in the outcome of a case must step down from the hearing of that case. “Bias” could mean either a pecuniary or personal bias, i.e. if the judge had a financial interest in or a relationship with one or more of the parties, then this would be relevant. The test for whether a judge should be disqualified from the hearing is that the court must ascertain the circumstances giving rise to bias, then ask whether a “fair-minded and informed observer” would conclude that there was a “real possibility” of bias.  One of the most prominent cases relating to bias was that surrounding the inquest of Diana, Princess of Wales. Mohammed Al-Fayed successfully mounted a challenge against Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, who was held to have been biased if she were to sit on the case as deputy coroner of the Queen’s household, given that a number of members of the Royal Family were implicated.  Meanwhile, in Pinochet (No 2) Lord Hoffman, then chairman of the charitable arm of Amnesty International, was disqualified from sitting as he was held to have an interest in the case. 
Despite the prominence of these cases debarring judges exhibiting real or perceived bias from sitting, such instances are few and far between. Upholding judicial independence may be the intention, but in practice, the Dominant ideology, even here, emerges more than that of Precision. The fact that these two cases went as far as they did before they were successfully challenged suggests that the judiciary may be hesitant to pronounce one of their own members as biased – again confirming the importance of stability in the conservative ideology.
So where does this leave us? If judicial independence primarily exhibits characteristics of Domination, then does this necessarily undermine the theory? The key aim of the judiciary is to uphold the rule of law through independence and impartiality; in the UK, the importance of the rule of law is enshrined in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  Although the narrow interpretation of the rule of law is merely that government action should have a legal function, many commentators have widened it to encompass fundamental substantive rights  – which, as we have seen, are more aligned with Precision. Thus, although Domination may be the primary ideology at work, it is, nevertheless, in competition with Precision.
The crucial question is whether the judiciary can be said to be truly independent, if it allows itself the possibility of prejudice through a lack of diversity and real or perceived bias. In many countries, however, the problem is worse than the presence of homogeneous white-haired men on the bench: the primary elements undermining judicial independence are corruption and political influence over the selection of judges, as demonstrated in a number of Latin American countries, sub-saharan Africa, and also the Czech Republic, Georgia, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka and Turkey.  In the UK, such instances of corruption are relatively rare, and one key element threatening to undermine judicial independence is prejudice against the ordinary citizen in the outcome of judgments.
The conclusion must be, then, that judicial independence is an idea that, in certain respects, translates well into reality. The majority of judgments are passed without scandal or the whiff of bias. Judges are paid relatively well, which lessens the possibility of having to pander to government officials, as is the case in developing countries where the courts are severely underfunded. However, in other aspects, the concept is a fiction. In its purest form, judicial independence protects the rights of ordinary people and ensures that the judiciary is completely aboveboard. But human nature being what it is, there will always be problems with implementing theory into practice.
For instance, although the conditions in which judges work (including relatively high pay, security of tenure, immunity from being sued from their actions in court) should in theory free them from pursuing their own personal interests or being pressured by the government, the reality can be quite different. In both the UK and the United States, sitting judges seeking promotion have an incentive to please the government in power; the changes ushered in by the Constitutional Reform Act, which provides for a supposedly impartial selection panel, have only been in operation for a year and so it remains to be seen how far this would actually improve judicial independence. As Walford has observed, ideologies often change and adapt from their original form, giving rise to a modification in attitudes ; therefore it is unsurprising that a divergence between theory and practice exists.
There is one major ideology that has not yet been explored in this context: that of Expediency. As the only non-political ideology, Expediency concerns itself primarily with utilitarian behaviour. Since it does not deal with principle or commitment to impersonal concerns, judicial independence as a theory does not fit into this ideological model. This does not, of course, prevent individual judges from making decisions based on expediency. One of the most prominent examples of such a judgment was that delivered by Lord Keith, in refusing an injunction to the Crown to stop publication of Peter Wright’s book in the notorious Spycatcher case:
“I do not base [the refusal] upon any balancing of public interest nor upon any considerations of freedom of the press – but simply upon the view that all possible damage to the interest of the Crown has already been done by the publication of Spycatcher abroad and the ready availability of copies in this country.” 
Thus, Expediency may fit in with the ideology behind judgments, but judicial independence, being a principle, does not belong in this category.
Does judicial independence have a place in the eidodynamic ideologies?
Judicial independence may have its place firmly in the eidostatic ideologies, with some elements in Precision and the majority in Domination, but the investigation would not be complete without briefly examining whether it may also occupy a position in any of the eidodynamic ideologies.
One distinguishing feature of Reform, Revolution and Repudiation is that to varying degrees, these ideologies are concerned with experimentation and transformation of society: a “period of transition between the old society and the new, a time of experimental advances, adjustments, and, should they prove necessary, retreats.”  The theory of judicial independence, however, has evolved over a period of centuries, and has been, thus far, characterised by slow and gradual reform. Even those who support the supposedly sweeping changes of the Constitutional Reform Act, which, among other things, introduces a functional separation of the judiciary from the legislature through the creation of a Supreme Court, fear that these moves may, in the end, be purely cosmetic. Some Law Lords, for instance, do not agree that there is a need for a Supreme Court to underscore judicial independence.
Indeed, proposed changes in legal institutions that are seen by the majority to upset the status quo are often met with disapproval if not hostility. Dr Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, provoked widespread controversy when he suggested – with reference to Muslim sharia law – that in certain circumstances, the law should recognise a plurality of jurisdictions, in which individuals “retain the liberty to choose the jurisdiction in which they will seek to resolve certain carefully specified matters” (such as financial transactions and mediation/conflict resolution).  The government immediately reacted by condemning Williams’ proposals. As Home Office minister Tony McNulty stated: “To ask us to fundamentally change the rule of law and to adopt sharia law, I think, is fundamentally wrong.” 
It would seem, then, that the eidodynamic ideologies, in providing an approach too radical for a democratic society, would be unable to accommodate a doctrine so closely associated with the eidostatic ideologies as judicial independence. At its most extreme, Repudiation – which manifests itself in Anarchism – proclaims that the only way to overcome the defects of society is to abolish it and leave people in a free-for-all scenario where they follow their inclinations to bring about peaceful cooperation.  Since under Anarchism all institutions, legal or otherwise, would disappear, it follows that judicial independence would become no more than a distant memory.
It appears that the concept of judicial independence is both a reality and a fiction. Elements of it work according to the ideology of Precision – the stated goal of protecting human rights, for instance – but in other ways it merely reverts to the Dominant ideology.
In a similar vein as other theories that seem to evoke Precision or Liberalism, once the surface is scratched, what is revealed in this concept is actually a reinforcement of Domination. For instance, Justine Doody suggests that the freedom of the press is merely an illusory notion that, in reality, reinforces the Dominant ideology. She states: “Although the ideal of a free press belongs to the parastatic ideology, the practice of journalism is frequently influenced by the epistatic ideology.” 
Acceptance of judicial independence as it currently stands may be explained by the perception of the “ruled” themselves. In his study of the crowd, Gustave Le Bon has identified a powerful force at work in society: prestige. He states: “Prestige in reality is a sort of domination exercised on our mind by an individual, a work, or an idea – a soldier in uniform, a judge in his robes, always enjoys prestige. Pascal has very properly noted the necessity for judges of robes and wigs. Without them they would be stripped of half their authority.” 
Le Bon seems to suggest that judges, as symbols of legal authority, are instinctively associated by members of society as representing the Dominant ideology. Walsby observes that conservatism is characterised by “reverence for authority and hierarchy.”  Applied to a modern democratic society, it may be that ordinary people, once faced with the imposing façade of the courtroom and the players with it, implicitly accept the Dominant ideology. Questioning of the validity of the judge’s reasoning or his or her “fitness” to judge is most likely far from their minds. As Walford has observed, the British political system operates largely in accordance with conservative beliefs and has continued to do so when the Conservative Party was out of office. 
Sir Igor Judge’s hope that judges should uniformly exhibit the necessary level of neutrality may be a vain one, at least for the present. Although, in today’s society, we may not quite be doomed to consistent judicial prejudice on the level of a Judge Sutcliffe, judicial independence has a long way to go before the elements of Precision – and improvement – within it can outstrip those of Domination.
 Sir Igor Judge, President of the Queen’s Bench Division, in Relations between the Executive, the Judiciary, and Parliament, House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2006-7, HL Paper 151, para. 29.
 Quoted in Gary Slapper, “The Law Explored: ethnic minorities and the judiciary,” The Times (London), 4 July 2007.
 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book XI.
 Paul Craig has explained the rule of law as follows: ‘A core idea of the rule of law … is that the government must be able to point to some basis for its actions that is regarded as valid by the relevant legal system.’ Relations between the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament, para. 24.
 supra, note 1.
 George Walford, Introduction, in Beyond Politics.
 Walford, supra note 6.
 Zvi Lamm, Ideologies in a Hierarchical Order.
 Walford, Beyond Politics, Chapter Four: The World Political Series.
 These terms were coined by Harold Walsby in The Domain of Ideologies (1946).
 Walford, Beyond Politics, Chapter Six: Ideology Beyond Politics.
 Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies, Part One, Chapter Six: Political Collectivism.
 Walford, “Meet Systematic Ideology.”
 Walford, Beyond Politics, Chapter Ten: The Eidodynamic.
 Walford, supra note 13.
 Walford, “Where Do We Go From Here?”
 supra note 13.
 Walford, “Pick Your Government.”
  QB 270.
 Walford, Beyond Politics, Chapter Three: The British Political Series, supra note 9.
 Martin Rader, quoted in Harold Walsby, “Political Collectivism,” in The Domain of Ideologies.
  2 WLR 73, 80, CA.
 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Relations between the Executive, the Judiciary, and Parliament, para. 26.
 Walford, “Pick Your Government.”
 Alisdair Gillespie, The English Legal System (Oxford, 2007), p. 198.
 Quoted in Gillespie, p.198.
 Walford, “Pick Your Government.”
 Gillespie, p.193.
 Vera Baird, “Judges are chosen from too small a gene pool,” The Times, 20 September 2005.
 Michael McHugh, AC, Women Justices for the High Court,” speech to the Western Australia Law Society, 27 October 2004.
 Walford, supra note 9.
 Harold Walsby, “Political Collectivism,” in The Domain of Ideologies.
 Gary Slapper, supra note 2.
 Lord Denning, in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord_Denning_MR
 Gary Slapper, supra note 2.
 Walford, “Education Determines Ideology.”
 Lawal v Northern Spirit  UKHL 35; “Discussing the rule against bias,” British Council e-newsletter, http://www.indlaw.com/legalfocus/focusdetails.aspx?ID=107
 Jon Silverman, “Uncomfortable ruling for coroner,” BBC News, 3 February 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/6412917.stm
 Pinochet (No 2)  1 AC 119.
 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part I, section 1.
 Paul Craig, supra note 1; Leon Fuller also argues that the law must possess some form of “internal morality.”
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Judicial Independence and Corruption,” http://www.transparency.org/content/download/18707/255317, p. 16.
 Walford, “Where do we go from here?”
 Attorney-General v Guardian (No 2)  1 AC 109.
 Walford, Beyond Politics, Chapter Two: Politics as Ideology.
 Rowan Williams, lecture at the Royal Court of Justice, 7 February 2008. Quoted in Paul Handley, “Williams Provokes Row Over Sharia Law,” http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/content.asp?id=51258
 Paul Handley, supra note 47.
 Walford, Beyond Politics, Chapter Three: The British Political Series.
 Justine Doody, “The Concept of a Free Press in an Eidostatic Society.”
 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1895).
 Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies, supra note 33.
 Walford, Beyond Politics, supra note 49.